them that Russia was on the verge of irreparable catastrophe for lack of the former and that the whole of the Allies might be beaten owing to the shipping shortage, long before America was ready to fight. Allies have always been mistrustful of each others' ulterior motives. I was told during the War that one distinguished Frenchman was convinced that the English having once again recovered possession of Calais never intended to surrender it at the end of the War. An equally distinguished Englishman was just as firmly persuaded that the French meant to annex Greece in order completely to dominate the Mediterranean and place the British communications to the East at the mercy of France. Jealousy is a foolish monster. America was altogether doubtful of Europe. She had a romantic affection for France because of the memories of Lafayette and Rochambeau. The shades of these champions of American liberty constituted an important part of the theatrical properties of every French Mission to the States and assured to every French envoy a favourable reception. But historical memories of England were not such as conduced to any sentimental glow. For Russia, democratic America had a definite repugnance. The Russian autocracy was a tyranny of the worst kind. France was a Republic and therefore free, but Russia and Italy and ourselves were classed with Germany and Austria in a favourite demagogic phrase as " the effete

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Monarchies of Europe." As we had to take the leading part in the borrowing for our Allies even more than for ourselves, there was a reluctance to be in any hurry to accommodate us. France might have fared better had she taken the lead. But although they had never shown any disposition to recoil when there was fight-